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PARADOX IN MORALS
BY WILLIAM KILBORNE STEWART
"Moralitat ohne Sinn fiir Paradoxic ist gemein."
—
Friedrich Schlegel.
I
IF we are content to define morality as the norm of conduct ap-
proved in a given age, we may safely say that paradoxes of
ethical theory arise but seldom, since morality is essentially a con-
servative thing. When such paradoxes do occur, they are usually
of a striking, even sensational sort, and occasion prolonged and
heated discussions. Ethical practice, necessarily something of a
compromise, is always being insensibly modified, but men hesitate
to scrutinize the foundations of morality.
But some fundamental questions at once suggest themselves.
In what does the essence of morality really consist? Is it, as the
derivation of the word indicates, custom? If so, what are we to say
about the hero and the martyr ? What are we to think of quixotism,
of "lost causes, and forsaken beliefs, and unpopular names, and im-
possible loyalties"? Or, again, may it not be that the intelligent man
has always to some extent fashioned his own moral code?
A contemporary American thinker of intellectual distinction has
written: "Etymology to the contrary, I shall locate the essence of
morality precisely in its contrast to custom." It was in some such
spirit as this that Friedrich Schlegel once coined the aphorism which
stands at the head of this article: "Morality without a sense for
paradox is tinctured with vulgarity."
Let us turn for confirmation to the beginnings of Christianity.
The spiritual atmosphere of the new religion is saturated with the
notions of life in death, gain in loss, victory in defeat, freedom in
bondage, wisdom in ignorance, strength made perfect in weakness,
things of naught confounding the things that are. The dominant
note is manifestly one of pronounced paradox. Here is, it would
seem, a complete reversal of the values of the contemporary Gentile
world, and even a radical recasting of the values cherished by the
Pharisees and Sadducees. Poverty, suffering, humility, ignorance,
and obloquy become virtues, the lowly are exalted and the high
brought down.
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Xevertheless, primitive Christianity does not stand in absolute
ethical isolation. Apart from anticipations in Isaiah and other Old
Testament prophets and from the possible influence of contem-
poraneous sects like the Essenes, there is an interesting parallel
in the Graeco-Roman world. The so-called paradoxes of Stoicism,
which are to be found in the writin.s^s of Cicero and Seneca, of
Epictetus and Marcivs Aurelius, bear no sliqht resemblance to those
of the Gospel. especialK' in the rncDmi^roniising nature of the de-
mands that are made. Like certain sayings in the Sermon on the
Moimt. they seem to flout ordinary experience. Mrtue, the Stoics
tell us, must be possessed entirely or not at all, and being eternal.
once possessed can never be lost. The wise man of Seneca is alone
free, happv. beautiful, alone possesses absolute wealth, alone is
true priest and king. There is such a marked similarity between
certain utterances of Seneca and those of St. Paul, that Lightfoot
has suggested that St. Paul may have picked the paradoxes up from
Greek professors of Stoicism in Tarsus. Cicero in a minor work
has listed six of the Stoic "Paradoxa." as he calls them. Probably
onlv one of these would seem indefensible to us : "That all sins
are equal among themselves and all good deeds equal among them-
selves." There is, says Cicero, only one virtue—obedience to rea-
son—and that is unshakable and eternal. Any dereliction of it is
a vice, and we must judge of evil acts not by their results but by
the vice they presuppose.
The paradoxical sayings of Epictetus are. for the most part,
variants of the general Stoic paradox. Thus, Socrates was not
in i^rison. because he chose to be there, and a man's prison is a
place that he is in against his will. "The multitude say 'Only the
free man may be educated,' l)ul the iihilosophers say 'Only the edu-
cated are free." " "May it ne\er be my lot to ha\c fiir friend a
wise fool: nothing is more difficvdt to handle." Some one objects
that the ]:)hilosophers talk i^aradoxes. "P.ut," replies Epictetus, "are
there no jjaradoxes in the ntju'r arts? Xay, what is more ])ara(loxi-
cal than to lance a man's eye that he may see? If one told this to
a person unskilled in the physician's art, would he not laugh at him
who said it? Is it surprising tluMi that in p]iilosii])h\- als(^ many
truths seem paradoxical to those who are unskilled ?".... What a
fme thing it is to be able to say to m\self that 1 am now putting into
action what other men only boa^t of in the lecture room and there-
l)y win a name for paradox!"
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II
For fifteen hundred years after the Gospel paradox was put
forward, there was no attempt at a new ethical evaluation in the
lands which had eml)raced Christianity. The moral precepts of
jesus, though perhaps never put into complete practice except hy
a rare St. Francis of Assisi, at least received official homage and
must have modified incalculably the conduct of men.
The Renaissance brought a revival of paganism in men's lives,
but only one man, Alachiavelli, ventured to construct a new ethic
based on pagan self-assertion in place of Christian self-sacrifice,
and even he wrote for princes and not for ordinary humanity.
About the same time, to be sure, Leonardo da \'inci was jotting
down in his notebook—but solely for his own behoof—some ar-
resting observations which ])lainly indicate his sense of the rela-
tivity of virtue and vice
:
Lust is the cause of generation.
Appetite is the stay of life.
Fear or timidity is the prolongation of life.
Deceit is the preservation of the instrument.
Machiavelli wished to divorce politics from ethics. He uses
constantly the word I'irfi) in the older pagan sense of manly courage
or self-reliant ability. He calls many things good in statecraft
which Christianity would denounce as evil. "A wise prince," he
says, "cannot nor ought not keep his faith given when the observ-
ance thereof turns to disadvantage and the occasions that make him
promise are past." He lauds in his model prince the temper which
does not shrink from "honorable frauds" and "glorious villanies."
Sometimes he is half apologetic, as when he says : "Cruelties may
be termed well-used (// if be lawful to say zvell of evil) that are
put in practice only once for security's sake, not insisting therein
afterwards." So far as I am aware, there is only one passage that
seems to hint a complete ethical revaluation : "If the Christian re-
ligion calls for strength in us, it is for strength to sufiter rather than
to do. This seems to have rendered the world zveak."
A book which enjoyed a brisk notoriety in its day was Bernard
Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, published originally in 1714 and
issued in an excellent critical edition by a young American scholar
in 1925. It is a rather short poem in doggerel, reinforced by prose
essays. The theme, as the subtitle itself indicates, is that "Private
Vices" are "Public Benefits."
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To enjoy the world's conveniences.
Be famed in war, yet live in ease,
Without great vices, is a vain
Utopia seated in tlie brain.
The bee-hive thrives as long as the private vices are practiced
:
Millions, endeavoring to supply
Each other's Lust and \'anity.
Thus every part was full of \'ice,
Yet the whole mass a Paradise.
But the hypocrites exclaim about their country's morals and prav
the gods for honesty. Jove unexpectedly grants the prayer, and
behold ! through the loss of individual vices, the hive at the same
time loses its greatness
:
As Pride and Luxury decrease.
So by degrees they leave the Seas.
All Arts and Crafts neglected lie
;
Content, the P)ane of Industry.
Makes 'em admire their homely Store
And neither seek nor covet more.
Mandeville observes in one of his prose sections : "What we
call evil in this world, moral as well as natural, is the grand prin-
ciple that makes us social creatures, the solid basis, the light and
support of all trades without exception. . . .The moment evil ceases,
society must be spoiled if not totally destroyed." It is, therefore,
as if he said: "If it be a vice by which the good of the world is
achieved, by all means let us be vicious, for viciousness of this kind
is not wickedness but virtue."
As a whimsical, professedly paradoxical work, Mandeville's
'Table" is not always to be taken with literal seriousness. None
the less, it did create a furore in England and was vigorously com-
batted by such men as Berkeley, Law, Hutcheson, and various
others ; and Mandeville himself became a sort of Lord High Bogy-
man, much as Ilobbes had been a little earlier and as John Wilkes
and Thomas Paine were to become later. Mis paradox is pro-
duced, as Sir Leslie Stei)hen i)oints out. by admitting with the di-
vines that the pursuit of wealth is radically wrong and by arguing
with the economists that it is essential to civilization. Of course
the paradox loses much of its point as soon as it is admitted that
in morals circumstances alter cases. And this was precisely the
view that was being urged by Utilitarianism which had its begin-
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nings about the same time. But from the standpoint of moral
rigorism, UtiHtarianism itself is, in the last analysis, immoral.
Ill
The great paradox of Rousseau, that civilization is inherently
and incurably corrupt, that the arts and sciences have simply led to
the moral debasement of men, that the only salvation is to return
to the life of nature and of primitive simplicity—this paradox, I
say, is mutatis mutandis a revival of the Gospel paradox. Once
more, it is blessed are the poor, the meek, the sim]5le-minded.
Whether the idea came to Rousseau, as he himself claimed, in a
flash of inspiration, or whether he deliberately adopted it as a para-
dox at the suggestion of Diderot, makes no difference for our pur-
pose. The point is that he did come to hold the idea vv^ith stubborn
and passionate conviction. But the necessary changes that I have
alluded to between Jesus and Rousseau are important. Rousseau had
no vision of a Kingdom of God on earth ; he contemplated a contin-
uing society. He did not advocate sexual asceticism. He empha-
sized, more than Jesus, the instincts, the expansive emotions, and
the principle of freedom. What has been called the eleutheromania,
the craze for freedom, of his followers, led them in many cases
far from the Christian ethic. But not all those who are commonly
included under the Rousseauistic formula were fanatics of liberty.
Wordsworth and Coleridge, after their brief radical fling, grew
tired of "unchartered freedom," and, feeling "the weight of chance
desires," "the weight of too much liberty," came to perceive that
The sensual and the dark rebel in vain.
Slaves by their own compulsion.
It is in Blake that Rousseau's expansiveness is reincarnated
—
Blake who said "The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom."
Many of Blake's paradoxes have seemed cryptic and esoteric, but
recent scholarship has shed much light on them and on Blake's men-
tal processes in general. Blake, like Bohme and some other mystics,
did not hesitate to synthesize all kinds of contradictions, and, to add
to the confusion he frequently, like Nietzsche, inverted termin-
ology. In his philosophy, Poetry or Imagination is the propulsive
force of the mind, of which the Reason has not yet been able to
render an exact account. This Poetic Imagination has created all
great thought, which Reason has only curbed and restricted. Rea-
son has set up an arbitrary code of moral values which it calls Good
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and Evil. But the great mind instinctively rejects such standards.
It sees that what is called Good is only the accepted conventions of
life, whereas Evil is the vital eners^y which must burst these con-
ventions and remould life. "-\11 the greatest men, including Jesus
and Milton, have been e\il in this meaning of the word. These men
act according ti) their own im]nilses, ignoring all established laws
of moralitv : for all such generalized laws are oppression, since
each man is an individual. They follow every instinct to the most
complete form of self-expression, lest they breed reptiles of the
brain." As r>lake said to Crabb Robinson: "What are called vices
in the natural world are the highest sublimities in the spiritual
world." This is his famous Marriatjc of Heaven and Hell.
l>lake*s "Proverbs of Hell'' (some of them immensely stimu-
lating paradoxes) are to be interpreted in this way. Since Evil
means Energy, Hell, the home of Evil, is the source of Energy.
And so he can say
:
"If the fool would persist in his folly he would become
wise."
"Prisons are built with stones of Law, brothels with bricks
of Religion."
"The tigers of wrath are wiser than the horses of in-
struction."
"He who desires but acts not, breeds pestilence."
"Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse un-
acted desires."
"Xo virtue can exist without breaking the Ten Command-
ments. Jesus was all virtue and acted from impulse, not from
rules."
Walt \Miitman in his ])oem Start'uuj from l\utiiianok is fairly
close to rilake
:
"I make the poem of evil also—I commemorate that also
;
I myself am just as much evil as good, and my nation is—
•
And I say there is in fact no evil."
P.rowning also is not far from the same standpoint in his lines:
"And the sin I impute to each frustrate ghost
Is the unlit lam]) and the imgirt loin.
Though the end in sight were a vice, I say."
Thoreau wrote in his Journal: "We cannot well do without our
sins; they are the highway of our \irtucs." Merman .Melville asks
in his novel Pierre; "Who does not feel more w.irmly to the Lord
r)f I'-.vil himself than towru-d a pi'lty sho])]<eci)er who dail}' ]iractices
all the discreet and servicea])le \irlucs."'
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The philosophers, indeed, have consistently maintained that the
true meaning of good is to he found in the overcoming of evil. Kant
said that the virtues which did not contend against perverted will
were, if not spleudida vifia, glancciide Laster, at least gldnsende
Armscligkeitcn. Ajid for Hegel virtue is the triumph over vice.
Holiness is the consciousness of sin with the consciousness of vic-
tory over sin. "Die Tugend is der voUendete Kampf."
IV
During the last fifty years as the supernatural sanctions of
morality have faded in men's minds, there has been a sharp renewal
of the ethical paradox. I can select only three strains which I re-
gard as the most significant : the attack on "idealism" begun by Ib-
sen and continued by men like Samuel Butler and Bernard Shaw,
the new sex morality of Havelock Ellis, and the teaching of Nietz-
sche.
There is something very disconcerting at first in Ibsen's assault
upon that cherished word "ideal." But his drift soon becomes
clear. "Don't use that foreign word, Ideals," says one of his char-
acters, "We have the good old native word, lies." If by the "ideal"
is meant the vision of what one thinks ought to be, then, indeed,
Ibsen had no quarrel either with the word or the thing, but was, on
the contrary, an undiluted idealist himself. But a so-called "ideal"
is too often a mask for concealing an unpleasant truth, a mist of
beautiful words which we draw about a thing until we can no longer
see it clearly. These sham ideals are the dregs of an exhausied
morality. Against them Ibsen waged incessant warfare, believing
that society was sick unto death so long as it remained under their
spell. Among these false ideals he reckoned the innocence of girl-
hood (for which read ignorance or possibly hypocrisy), the no-
tion of the womanly woman, the notion that woman should be full
of self-sacrifice and self-surrender, romantic love between the sexes
(which Shaw calls "lust dressed up in its Sunday clothes"), the
profession that love is always ardent, as if it never burned low,
that family life is necessarily beautiful and that the members of a
family are naturally bound together by ties of afifection. To these
Bernard Shaw would add such pseudo-ideals as the beatific content-
ment of poverty, the glory of war, etc. Ibsen and Shaw have tried
to set up honest, vital truths in the place of these masks which only
cover what is false or hollow.
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Here are a few ty]Mcal paradoxical sayings of Ibsen, due al-
lowance being made for the possibility that some of the speeches
mav have been intended dramatically
:
"When a truth is hoary with years, it is in a fair way to
become a lie.
"
"A normally constituted truth will live, say. at the very
outside, twenty years.... But such truths are always shock-
ingly emaciated."
"Wisdom in extremes is folly;
Cowardice in flower is cruelty
;
Truth, when exaggerated, is but wisdom backwards."
"One day it will be clearly seen that the greatest victory
lies in defeat."
"The strongest man in the world is the man who stands
alone."
For Shaw, as for Ibsen, the true ideal is the free development
of personality. Anything which thwarts that is evil, though it bear
a sounding name and be hallowed by age and religious sanction.
His paradoxical epigrams are, like the man himself, flaring and
audacious. But though intended to be shocking, most of them seem
to me to be neither subtle nor very searching, but rather to merit
the description which someone has given of them as statements of
the obvious in terms of the scandalous. Many of them are jibes
at the cant phrases of Christian moralizing. Thus:
"The only golden rule is that there are no golden rules."
"Do not love your neighbor as yourself. If you are on
good terms with yourself, it is an impertinence ; if on bad, an
injury."
"Do not do unto others as you would that they should do
unto you. Their tastes may not be the same."
"Never resist temptation; prove all things; hold fast that
which is good."
"Every step in progress means a duty repudiated and a
Scripture torn up."
"The love of virtue always begins with a hatred of
morality."
Some of Sanuiel Butler's ethical ])aradoxes follow:
"It is as immoral to be too good as to be too anything
else."
"If \()U reall\- wish to understand \irtuc you must be
subvicious."
"How often do wc not see children ruined through the
virtues, real or supposed, of their parents. Truly, lie \isitcth
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the virtues of the fathers upon the children unto the third
and fourth generation."
"It is all very well for mischievous writers to maintain
that we cannot serve God and Mammon. Granted that it is
not easy, but nothing that is worth doing ever is easy. Easy
or difficult, possible or impossible, not only has the thing got
to be done, but it is exactly in doing it that the whole duty of
man consists."
We may take Havelock Ellis as a fitting representative of the
new sex-ethics. After what Edward Carpenter called the "impure
hush'' of Victorianism (Bernard Shaw referred to it as "indecency's
conspiracy of silence"), this franker and more truly civilized atti-
tude toward sex must have seemed doubly paradoxical. If Jesus
entirely repudiated sex, as I believe to have been the case, then his
doctrine is balanced by the equally drastic counter-paradox of El-
lis who has taught that sex is vital and essential, wholesome and
beautiful, even in many of its alleged aberrations : that nothing
which happens in sex-love between man and woman is to be called
common or unclean. This, I take it, is substantially the point of
view of the rising generation in Europe and America.
In point of fact, the history of Christianity in its relations to sex
is sadly in need of a candid investigation. The teachings of Jesus
are explicit enough, no matter how hierarchy, theologians, and
scholars have sought to evade or soften the issue, and the state-
ments of St. Paul abound in the same sense : all sexuality is sin.
Priestly celibacy and monastic vows of chastity are the direct and
logical outcome of this primitive Christian attitude. The author of
"The Imitation of Christ" wrote : "Be not familiar with any
woman ; but commend all good women in general to God." Tolstoy,
who perhaps more than any other modern tried to repeat and re-
inforce the spiritual paradoxes of Jesus, said : "He who regards
woman—above all his wife—with sensuality, already commits adul-
tery with her." And he comments on certain passages in the Gos-
pels : "The Christian ideal is not marriage : marriage from a
Christian point of view, is an element not of progress but of down-
fall ; love, with all that precedes and follows' it, is an obstacle to the
true human ideal." He adds that the ideal, by its very definition,
is incapable of complete realization ; it is an appeal to the heroic
energies of the soul. Tolstoy's Krentzer Sonata is the legitimate de-
scendant of such texts as Matthew V, 28, and XIX, 11 and 12.
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Christendom in all its divisions has departed startlingly from
these teachings. How little of the primitive Christian attitude did
Luther apprehend, when, in the profane exuberance of his recoil
from asceticism, he called the monks and nuns who had renounced
their vows "blessed robbers," and remarked that "True chastity is
in lust, and the more unclean the lust, the more beautiful the chas-
tity!"' Clemens Brentano, a Roman Catholic, who showed the typi-
cal vacillation and self-indulgence of the German romanticists, said:
"It sounds paradoxical, but it is nevertheless true, that he who is
born to voluptuousness and does not practice it, leads a truly sin-
ful life. Nothing is less chaste than a passionate girl who remains
virtuous. And should a voluptuous sinner repent of her passions,
she would forthwith lose her innocence."" Even the more cautious
Coleridge once suggested that a treatise might be written in praise
of the moral elevation of Gargantua and Pantagrual. It "would
make the church stare and the conventicle groan, and yet would be
truth and nothing but truth."'
Nietzsche's ethical paradoxes are not only iconoclastic, as be-
fits his "transvaluation of all values,'" they are also phrased with
a strident insistency that has dinned them into people"s con-
sciousness and made them, so to speak, international property. Such
winged words as "beyond good and evil.'" "the blond beast." "mas-
ter-moralitv and slave-morality" served their turn valiantly for
him in his campaign to destroy those twin-evils, Christianity and
democracy, as a prelude to the establishment of the new culture
which was to be based on the primitive instincts. Nietzsche is one
of the world's greatest paradoxers. It is interesting to observe
how characterizations of him are almost inevitably cast in a para-
doxical form. Georg Rrandcs called him an "aristocratic radical" ;
others have called him the "murderer of God,"" a "God-intoxicated
blas])hemer,"" and an "Epicurean Stoic,"' "the Pascal of Pagan-
ism." a "mystic of rationalism." Nietzsche called himself an "Im-
nwralist der Tugend,"" investing the word "Tugend"' with the
masculine meaning of Machiavelli's "virtu."" Tie ])roclainK'd the
ego hol\' and selfishness blessed, (lut (good) is not opposed to
J'ose (evil) but to .*^chlecbt (despicable). "Man," be s.iid, "nuist
become better and more e\il." IhU Christianitx', that slave-insur-
rection in morale, bad sul)stitiiU'(l for tln' old i);igan \-irtues of
strcnglb aufl efficiency tlic ethics of tin- oppressed, the sulTering,
the plaved-out. the unnerxcd. Tberefoix', ( hristianit}" and its modern
PARADOX IN MORALS 241
concomitants, democracy and socialism, are sclilccht; they are the
refuge of the failures in life. To revert to the old values—master
morality and the aristocracy of excellence—to inculcate the will
to power, to preach tragic optimism as the mood of strong men,
was Nietzsche's mission. All his most revolutionary ethical para-
doxes take their appropriate place in this setting:
"Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars. And the
short peace better than the long."
"Ye say, a good cause will hallow every war? I say
unto you ! It is the good war which halloweth every cause."
"Ye have heard how it was said of old 'Blessed are the
peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God.'
But I say unto you, 'Blessed are the war-makers, for they
shall be called the children of Wotan who is greater than
Jehovah.'
"
"Not peace of mind, but more power; not peace at all,
but war ; not virtue, but efficiency. The weak and the ill-con-
ditioned shall go to the wall, and we shall help them to do it.
What is more harmful than any vice? Active sympathy with
all these misbegotten and weak."
"I call Christianity the one immortal blemish of mankind."
Any consideration of latter-day morality would be incomplete
without a reference to one of the most striking symptoms of the
modern attitude—the loss of the sense of sin—though the matter
perhaps concerns theology and mysticism more than it does ethics.
The much quoted lines of Edward Fitzgerald's version of the
"Rubaiyat" express the change in trenchant paradox
:
"Oh Thou who Man of baser Earth didst make.
And e'en with Paradise devise the Snake,
For all the Sin with which the Face of Man is blackened,
Man's Forgiveness give—and take."
Swinburne proclaimed that statement to be the summit of human
philosophy, and an American novelist of the present generation
has declared that it epitomizes admirably the mature conviction of
the modern age.
